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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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1 OF 1

12 OCT 1972

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**FBIS TRENDS****12 OCTOBER 1972****- 1 -****TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 2 - 8 OCTOBER 1972****Moscow (2993 items)**

GDR National Day	(--)	7%
[Soviet Leaders' Greetings]	(--)	5%]
Malaysian Premier Razak in USSR	(0.1%)	7%
Indochina	(6%)	6%
U.S./USSR Ratification of SALT Agreement	(3%)	4%
China	(7%)	4%

Peking (1050 items)

Domestic Issues	(38%)	57%
[PRC National Day]	(8%)	26%]
UNGA Session	(6%)	15%
[Chiao Kuan-hua Speech]	(--)	9%]
Sino-Japanese Relations	(29%)	11%
Indochina	(2%)	4%
Lesotho National Day	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media insist that the two sides' positions on a settlement remain far apart, and characteristically they have failed to report the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks held on four consecutive days from 8 through 11 October. President Nixon's 5 October press conference remarks as well as Ambassador Porter's statement at the Paris session that day were said to reflect an unreasonable negotiating stand which views the Saigon regime as the only legitimate authority and demands the elimination of the PRG. Both Hanoi and the Front have continued to contrast the "unreasonable" U.S. stand with the PRG's "realistic" call for a provisional government made up of three equal components representing the Saigon regime without Thieu, the PRG, and other political forces.

U.S. air strikes in Hanoi on 11 October which reportedly damaged the French diplomatic mission were promptly assailed in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement that day--the first protest at that level since a 17 August statement on strikes at the capital the day before. Peking's NCNA promptly carried the text of the DRV protest, while TASS transmitted a brief report of it.

Moscow's minimal attention to Vietnam includes a reaffirmation of support for the Vietnamese struggle by Podgorny in a speech at a 10 October dinner for the visiting Shah of Iran. Without mentioning the 11 September PRG statement, Podgorny also said that the "constructive proposals" of the DRV and PRG offer "a good basis for a fair political settlement." President Nixon's 5 October press conference prompted only brief Moscow reports which noted without comment, among other things, the President's remark that U.S. bombing and mining of the DRV will continue until there is some agreement on the negotiating front.

Stock Chinese support for the Vietnamese was offered by UN delegate Chiao Kuan-hua in his 3 October General Assembly address. Chiao backed the PRG's seven points and its 11 September proposal and pledged firm PRC support for the Indochinese war effort. Meanwhile, NCNA reported the arrival in Peking on 7 October of a DRV "experts' delegation" led by Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban which is to discuss China's 1972 "economic and military" assistance to Vietnam.

HANOI SAYS INTRANSIGENCE SHOWN BY PRESIDENT, AT PARIS TALKS

Hanoi reacted to the President's 5 October unscheduled press conference at the White House in routine, low-keyed comment which

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claimed it showed that he "still maintains his stubborn and extremely unreasonable negotiating stand." The initial comment came promptly on the 6th in a Hanoi radio commentary which acknowledged much of the substance of the President's remarks. Subsequent, limited comment included a VNA commentary and an article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 7th which also condemned alleged U.S. "obstruction" and "escalation." But atypically--and inexplicably--there has been no monitored reaction from the party daily NHAN DAN, normally a standard vehicle for comment on statements by the President.*

The Hanoi radio commentary seized on the President's assertion that the right kind of settlement would be one that prevented the imposition of a communist government, countering with the standard denial that the communists have any such intention. To bolster the denial, the broadcast recalled that the 11 September PRG statement proposing a provisional government of national concord made up of three equal components "clearly pointed out" PRG readiness to reach agreement with the United States that neither side will impose a government on South Vietnam. It went on to repeat the formulation suggesting guarantees for such an agreement which had been introduced in the 25 September NHAN DAN Commentator article.** The broadcast--as well as PRG Foreign Minister Binh at the 5 October Paris session--echoed Commentator in suggesting that the United States could agree with the parties concerned on "necessary measures" to insure that no side is allowed to control the political life of South Vietnam.

* Hanoi has frequently reacted to the President's press conferences with "Commentator" articles as well as less authoritative items in NHAN DAN. There was a Commentator article on the 29 June press conference at which the President announced that the Paris talks would be resumed on 13 July, but the 27 July press conference at which he discussed the issue of possible bombing damage to dikes prompted lower-level press comment. Two days after the President's 29 August press conference in San Clemente--and 11 days before the release of the PRG's latest statement on a political settlement--a NHAN DAN Commentator article mentioned the press conference as well as the President's 23 August speech at the Republican convention in the course of detailing the respective negotiating positions of the two sides. See the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 1-6.

** See the TRENDS of 27 September 1972, pages 1-3.

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The radio commentary argued along the lines of earlier comment which had deprecated the U.S. reaction to the 11 September proposal when it insisted that the settlement which the President described as the "right kind" is one which demands that the South Vietnamese people must recognize the Saigon "puppet" administration as the sole authority and accept the elimination of the PRG. Mme. Binh at the 12 October Paris session also said the President's press conference remark that he would never agree to a settlement which "directly or indirectly would impose a communist government on the South Vietnamese" was a pretext for continued U.S. maintenance of the Thieu administration. She went on to assail the United States for refusing to stop support of the "warlike group in Saigon" and for opposing "the South Vietnamese demand that Thieu resign and the Saigon administration change its policy" and proceed toward a government of national concord.

The Hanoi broadcast on the 6th complained that the U.S. delegate at the Paris session on 5 October "still repeated Nixon's colonialist and aggressive 8 May proposal," but it did not recall any of the substance of the proposal. The broadcast and other comment on the press conference also ignored the President's passing reference to a cease-fire. The commentary on the 6th indirectly acknowledged that private talks had been taking place when it cited the President as saying that "the present peace negotiations--proceeding secretly--had reached a sensitive stage." The VNA commentary on the 7th obscured the reference to private talks when it said the President "insinuated," in an attempt to "make believe that he too is prompted by good will," that the Paris conference has reached a "sensitive stage." VNA dismissed the President's remarks in standard fashion as an effort to placate and deceive U.S. and world opinion. It also reported that DRV delegate Xuan Thuy had said after the Paris session on the 5th that the positions "are still far apart" and that Mme. Binh claimed that the Paris conference had been obstructed by Ambassador Porter's rejection of the 11 September proposal.

Comment pegged to the press conference routinely reaffirmed Vietnamese determination to continue the struggle: The initial radio commentary said that the President's characterization of the 1968 bombing halt "as a very great mistake" and his expressed intention to continue the bombing and mining until some agreement is reached again "had exposed his illusion of using bombs and shells to create negotiating pressure." The

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QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 7th also assailed alleged U.S. attempts to negotiate from a position of strength and vowed to continue the struggle until final victory.

PARIS SESSION The VNA account of the 5 October session of the Paris talks typically dismissed Ambassador Porter's statement with the cryptic assertion that "at today's session, the U.S. delegate again dwelt on the colonialist proposals made by President Nixon on 8 May." But a commentary broadcast in Hanoi's domestic service on the 9th said Porter "argued that there is no more effective or rapid way" to restore peace "than through an Indochina-wide cease-fire under international supervision." The commentary then asked rhetorically why a cease-fire is desired "by the U.S. ruling clique headed by Nixon, the notorious hawk who has been escalating the war on an unprecedentedly fierce level throughout the Indochina peninsula." It went on to repeat the line that this is part of the scheme to keep the Thieu administration intact, and it observed that this runs counter to the overall solution proposed by the PRG in which both military and political problems must be solved simultaneously.

The radio commentary also labeled as "arrogant" the President's 8 May statement that the bombing, mining, and blockading of North Vietnam ports will be stopped only after a cease-fire, saying this means that U.S. "crimes" against the North will be stopped only if the "puppet" administration is maintained. It took specific issue with "point three of Nixon's deceptive eight-point proposal" which, it said, provides for the "puppet" administration to continue ruling the South, with Thieu's resignation coming "only just before the presidential elections."

The VNA account of the Paris session on the 5th noted Mme. Binh's reiteration of the stand that military and political questions must be settled simultaneously, as well as her remark that the proposal for a provisional government of national concord does not entail the removal of anyone except Thieu from the present Saigon administration. The account also reported Xuan Thuy as recalling that the "first requirement" of the PRG's 11 September proposal calls for an end to U.S. support of the Thieu administration as well as for a U.S. withdrawal.

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Mme. Binh at the 12 October Paris session spelled out both the first requirement, including the demand for an end to U.S. support of Thieu, and the second one on a provisional government of national concord which would take charge of affairs during the "transition period" and organize "truly free and democratic general elections."

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSAILS BOMBING OF HANOI, FRENCH MISSION

Breaking its eight-week pattern of issuing only routine foreign ministry spokesman statements protesting U.S. air strikes in North Vietnam, the DRV Foreign Ministry on 11 October promptly assailed U.S. bombing of Hanoi that day which allegedly "almost totally destroyed" the French diplomatic mission. The statement was presumably issued at the foreign-ministry level because Hanoi felt it could use the incident involving a diplomatic establishment to bolster its charges that U.S. strikes are aimed at civilian targets. This is the first statement at this level since one on 17 August protested strikes at the capital the day before; other attacks in the capital since then had prompted only routine-level foreign ministry spokesman protests.*

Three hours in advance of the statement Hanoi media had reported the bombing, saying that the building had been damaged and that injuries had been suffered by the French delegate general, several staff members, and the Albanian charge d'affaires then in the building. Amplifying these charges, the statement claimed that U.S. bombs and shells had "very seriously" wounded the French delegate general and that they had also killed or wounded "a number of French and Vietnamese personnel" within the building as well as wounding the Albanian charge d'affaires. The strikes were also said to have resulted in the "killing or wounding" of "many civilians and the destruction of many houses and much property of the Vietnamese people."

The statement declared that the "savage attack" on Hanoi by the Nixon Administration had "laid bare the U.S. imperialists' deceitful allegations that civilian targets are not bombed and

* Of the 14 routine foreign ministry spokesman statements issued since 17 August protesting U.S. strikes at targets within the Hanoi metropolitan area, six had claimed damage to the downtown area itself.

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that the United States is pursuing the path of negotiations and is bringing to an end the U.S. involvement in Vietnam." At the same time, however, the Administration was called upon to "seriously negotiate at the Paris conference on Vietnam and positively respond to the PRGRSV's seven-point solution and its 11 September statement." The protest concluded with a standard injunction for the governments of the "fraternal socialist countries" to "stay the bloody hands of the U.S. aggressors and to support and help still more strongly the Vietnamese people's just struggle" until complete victory.

The VNA press review on the 12th said that all Hanoi newspapers published detailed reports, illustrated with photos, on the destruction of the French diplomatic mission. DRV media on that day also reported that Premier Pham Van Dong and other state officials had paid a hospital visit to Delegate General Susini on the evening of the 11th. Focusing on the damage allegedly inflicted on the French mission, a NHAN DAN article, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 12th, provided a detailed account of the "indiscriminate" attack on the "center of Hanoi." It reported that "many domestic and foreign journalists and foreign diplomats came to witness the Nixon's clique's barbarous crime." One of the employees at the French diplomatic office was quoted as having declared that this "deliberate crime . . . must be tried at an international court."

Secretary Laird's 11 October comments on the U.S. strike at Hanoi and the reported damage to the French diplomatic mission were denounced in a Hanoi radio report on the 12th which argued that the "warlike allegations by Laird . . . expose the Nixon Administration's deceitful allegations that it is taking the path of negotiations and is terminating the U.S. involvement in Vietnam." Without citing any of Laird's specific remarks, Hanoi said that they made clear that the United States "plans to continue bombing North Vietnam even if there is a danger that similar accidents could recur." Denouncing the Nixon Administration as a "clique of warlike men who remain stubborn despite the fact that their Vietnamization policy and lackeys in South Vietnam are on the brink of the abyss of total defeat," the broadcast declared that the "heroic Vietnamese people will never yield before U.S. bombs and shells."

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OTHER COMMENT
ON BOMBING

Aside from the prompt and high-level reaction to the bombing of the capital on the 11th, Hanoi issued little notable comment on the relatively heavy U.S. bombing of the past week. DRV propagandists have, however, provided extensive followup coverage of the 3 October press conference at which both the DRV War Crimes Commission and the mayors of 37 cities and municipalities issued appeals protesting alleged U.S. attacks on DRV cities with the intent of massacring the civilian population. The increase in U.S. bombing missions over the North was reflected in the high number of planes reported downed--29 for the week ending 12 October, including three B-52's.* Hanoi has continued to publicize articles calling for improving the air defense system and heightening efforts to down the 4,000th U.S. plane. As of 11 October, Hanoi claimed to have downed 3,994 U.S. aircraft.

U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam continued to be protested in routine daily statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. An alleged U.S. attack on the downtown area and suburbs of Hanoi on the 6th was protested by the spokesman that day and again on the 7th. The 6 October statement cited specific locations in an around the capital which ~~were~~ allegedly bombed, including Ly Quoc Su street in the downtown area. And a 6 October VNA report on the bombing said the street was a "busy area in the heart of Hanoi" and enumerated some of the alleged casualties. Protests from the foreign ministry spokesman also included the charges that U.S. planes carried out further mining in the sea approach to Haiphong on the 5th and bombed in the area of that port city on the 5th, 7th, 8th, and 11th.

The spokesman's protests did not specifically acknowledge the 8 October B-52 raid against the port of Vinh, announced by the United States and described as the deepest B-52 raid inside North Vietnam in almost six months. However, a spokesman's protest on the 12th did charge that B-52's had bombed Vinh city the day before. Earlier Hanoi protests had not specified the use of B-52's when they claimed that Vinh, the capital of Nghe An Province, had been attacked on the 7th, 8th, and 9th. The

* Hanoi claimed 28 planes during the period from 26 September to 2 October. That figure had also been reached for the week 7 to 13 September. The past week's alleged feats were also notable for the claimed downing of three B-52's. Hanoi has sporadically claimed that B-52's have been downed over the North, although the U.S. Command has not confirmed this.

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statements had seemed to reflect the deeper B-52 strikes, however, when they charged that on the 7th and 8th the B-52's had bombed targets in Ha Tinh Province--located just south of Nghe An. This is the first time in recent months that Hanoi has claimed the B-52's were used as far north as Ha Tinh, although B-52 strikes in the southernmost province of Quang Binh and in the Vinh Linh zone have been cited regularly in spokesman's statements.

Protests continued their usual pattern of stressing alleged destruction of civilian targets. Thus, for example, the 10 October spokesman's statement--charging among other things that U.S. planes the previous day had attacked the provincial capital and several civilian targets in Thai Binh Province--specified that the planes had bombed a dike construction site at Min Tan village, Kien Xuong District, Thai Binh Province, "killing and wounding many people who were building the dike." (U.S. sources reported that barracks in Thai Binh were among targets struck on the 9th.)

POW'S Hanoi radio on 5 October reported the names of five "newly captured" American pilots, the first such release of names since 25 August, when ten names were released; VNA during the week issued what were purported to be statements by the pilots themselves regarding their capture. The five pilots were identified as Navy Lt. Commander Dale Virgil Raebel, Air Force Captain Jerome Donald Heeren, Air Force Lt. Colonel James William O'Neil, Navy Lt. (j.g.) David Anderson Everett, and Navy Lt. Commander Theodore Wallace Triebel; they were reportedly captured in action between 17 August and 29 September.

CONCLUSION OF FOUR-PART GIAP ARTICLE BELATEDLY PUBLISHED

The North Vietnamese army daily QUAN DOI NHAN DAN from 25 to 28 September belatedly published in installments the last section of a four-part article by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, entitled "Arm the Revolutionary Masses and Build a People's Army." A 5 January 1972 Hanoi broadcast had announced that the article would consist of four parts and that the first section, dealing with Marxist-Leninist theories of military organization, had been published in the December 1971 issue of the military journal QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The January issue of the army journal carried the second section, dealing with Vietnamese historical experiences in building armed forces, and the February issue of the journal published what

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turned out to be a portion of the third section on the Vietnamese party's creativity in arming the masses and building the army.* The DRV party journal HOC TAP in its January and February issue republished the first and second sections of the article and in April carried a third section which was longer than the version published in the February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.

Hanoi provided no explanation for the delay in publishing the fourth part. The 25 September QUAN DOI NHAN DAN introduced the section with a note saying that the article had been "recently" written and had been published in "recent" issues of the journals HOC TAP and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. However, following passages which clearly were written prior to the resumption of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam in April, the paper inserted a footnote saying "article written in March 1972." This final section of the article is a seemingly standard presentation of long-range guidelines for building armed forces in both North and South Vietnam, repeating the traditional doctrine which calls for the development of three troop categories--main-force units, regional troops, and militia and self-defense forces. Giap also seemed to be offering standard fare when, among other things, he stressed the importance of the "spiritual factor" in war but explained that the effect of this factor could not be developed if there is "an inferior standard of technical equipment, an irrational organization of forces, or incorrect fighting methods."

* The first three sections of the article were discussed in the 26 April 1972 TRENDS, pages 6-8.

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DISARMAMENT

PEKING MOVES TO COUNTER SOVIET DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES IN UN

PRC chief delegate Chiao Kuan-hua, addressing the UN General Assembly on 3 October, responded to the latest Soviet disarmament initiatives with a strong attack on the proposals advanced by Foreign Minister Gromyko in his UNGA speech on 26 September, as well as with the most elaborate Chinese critique of the SALT agreements to date and with a further embellishment of the Chinese prerequisites for an international conference on disarmament. Moscow, accusing the Chinese of trying to "artificially divorce" the problems of conventional and nuclear armaments, had included both conventional and nuclear arms in its nonuse of force proposal. Peking has now responded by placing new emphasis on conventional arms, along with nuclear, in its own disarmament position. Contending that "the most urgent question today is the withdrawal of foreign armed forces rather than the reduction of armaments," Chiao declared: "Let the two superpowers withdraw all their armed forces, both conventional and nuclear, back to their own countries." The specification of conventional forces is new.

Chiao aimed his remarks on disarmament chiefly at the Soviet draft resolution on renunciation of the use of force coupled with a permanent ban on the use of nuclear weapons, at Moscow's renewed call for a world disarmament conference (WDC), and at the Soviet call for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, although Gromyko had brought up the test ban issue only in passing in his UNGA speech.*

+ Chiao accused the Soviet Union of propounding an "alarmist theory" when it argued, in support of its nonuse of force proposal, that the destructive power even of conventional warfare has increased so greatly that the use of conventional weapons alone can lead to the annihilation of entire nations. He emphasized that "the nonuse of force in international relations can only be conditional." He underscored Peking's insistence on the distinction between just and unjust wars in concluding that an agreement on nonuse of force should not apply to struggles

* Background on Soviet initiatives at the 27th session of UNGA may be found in the TRENDS of 20 September 1972, pages 30-35, and 27 September, pages 25-26.

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against imperialist aggression and colonialism, and he suggested that a proposal for a ban on aggression in international relations might have been more appropriate. Chiao ignored the fact that Gromyko had placed similar conditions on the application of a nonuse of force agreement. Addressing himself to Moscow's linkage of nuclear and conventional use bans, which had seemed at least partially responsive to what Moscow claimed was a Chinese effort to divorce limitations on nuclear weapons from controls on conventional armaments, Chiao turned that linkage back against Moscow: In fact, he said, this linkage is tantamount to "demanding that the people of the world give up their armed struggle against aggression, otherwise nuclear weapons will be used against them."

+ Chiao reaffirmed the Chinese view of Moscow's concept of a world disarmament conference. Citing Gromyko's letter on WDC to UN Secretary General Waldheim of August 14, not publicized in Soviet media,* Chiao claimed that a WDC without a clear aim would in fact be an "empty talk club" serving only to "hoodwink and lull the world." Listing prerequisites for such a conference, he went beyond his statement last year that nuclear countries must first pledge never to be the first to use nuclear weapons and must "dismantle all nuclear bases set up on the territories of other countries and withdraw all their nuclear armed forces and all nuclear weapons and means of delivery from abroad." Now including conventional forces, he stated that the nuclear countries, "particularly the Soviet Union and the United States, must withdraw from abroad all their armed forces, including nuclear-missile forces, and dismantle all their military bases, including nuclear bases, on the territories of other countries."

+ Chiao recapped and embellished past Chinese criticisms of the SALT agreements, the partial test ban and nuclear nonproliferation treaties, and the Soviet proposal for a comprehensive test ban, assessing the Soviet purpose in all of them to be the maintenance of its nuclear monopoly. He betrayed sensitivity to criticism of the PRC's continued nuclear testing by dwelling on the USSR's comprehensive test ban proposal, even though it was played down in Gromyko's speech and in Soviet comment on the UNGA session thus far. He insisted that the Chinese were making nuclear tests "under

* The letter was responsive to the UN resolution of 16 December 1971 soliciting specific proposals from member states by 31 August on the structure and agenda of a world disarmament conference. Moscow media briefly reported responses from some East European countries but did not acknowledge the dispatch of a Soviet reply.

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compulsion" for purposes of self-defense, and he again stated that a test ban must be linked with "complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons." His critique of the SALT agreements encompassed past Chinese charges, designed to picture the accords as conducive to an intensified arms race, and for the first time made use of the argument--put forth by Western critics--that the agreements "only stipulate some limitation on the quantity of certain categories of nuclear weapons in the possession of the Soviet Union and the United States, but impose no limitation at all on their quality."

MOSCOW PICTURES PRC AS ISOLATED, REBUTS CHINESE ATTACKS

Moscow's response to the PRC delegate's UNGA speech has been to picture Peking as isolated and its reaction to the Soviet proposals on disarmament as part and parcel of a policy that runs counter to the international trend of detente. Nikolay Bragin observed in the 8 October PRAVDA that "the only speaker at the present UN General Assembly to have opposed the Soviet proposal was the PRC representative," and a TASS report on 5 October played on the triangular dimension in singling out the PRC and the United States as the "exceptions" to general support for a world disarmament conference.

Moscow reacted in particular to the Chinese line on the "super-powers." TASS reported on 12 October that issue No. 42 of the weekly NEW TIMES would carry an article condemning Chiao's "dissonant" speech for repeating "propaganda regarding the notorious superpowers concept" and for criticizing the foreign policy of the USSR and "other peace-loving countries." NOVOSTI political observer Spartak Beglov, in an article published in the Bulgarian newspaper ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME on 8 October, charged that the PRC had "artificially" reduced the whole disarmament problem to a demand that "the two superpowers" not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Chiao's speech as a whole, Beglov said, reflected Chinese displeasure with "the process of detente in some parts of the world." Registering sensitivity to the Chinese charge that the Soviet proposal on nonuse of force did not distinguish between just wars against imperialist aggression and unjust wars, Beglov accused Chiao of "slandorously distorting the Soviet proposals" by claiming that they contained "indiscriminate demands" to deprive some nation or other of the right to resist aggression and imperialist expansion."

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PEKING ON EUROPE

PRC SEES EUROPEAN SECURITY BLOCKED BY "SUPERPOWER" CONTROL

PRC chief delegate Chiao Kuan-hua's 3 October speech to the UN General Assembly focused on superpower perfidy in explaining Chinese opposition to the conference on European security, preparations for which are tentatively slated to begin in Helsinki this fall. Reflecting Peking's patent interest in opposing any European detente arrangement that would further solidify Soviet and U.S. influence in Europe, Chiao asserted that in current conditions of "superpower" control of rival military blocs, no viable system of European security is possible. To ensure real "peace and security," he said, it is necessary to oppose superpower interference and control, end military blocs, withdraw all foreign troops, and conduct relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. In this context Chiao hailed the "increasing number" of European states demanding equal participation in the security negotiations and highlighted their opposition to the superpowers' "monopolizing everything behind the backs of other countries."

While Chiao did not refer to either "superpower" by name, he made pointed allusions to Moscow while carefully restricting his criticism of the United States. Recalling the 1968 Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia, he criticized "a superpower" for launching "a surprise attack to occupy an ally with massive troops" and cited "noninterference in each other's internal affairs" as a condition for European security.

BACKGROUND Chiao's speech contained Peking's first comprehensive discussion of the European security question in recent years. Occasional allusions to the issue over the past several months had seemed aimed at developing a Chinese position which would express due sympathy for the widespread European strivings for stability and would focus on "superpower" interference as the prime cause of continued discord.

In a banquet speech at a French National Day reception in Peking this July, Chiao Kuan-hua avoided direct reference to European security but assailed superpower hegemony in Europe and asserted that relations between countries "with different

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or identical social systems should all be based" on the principles of peaceful coexistence. An oblique jab at Soviet hegemony in East Europe was contained in the 16 May Sino-Dutch communique raising relations to the ambassadorial level, when the Dutch explicitly interpreted the principles of peaceful coexistence as implying noninterference in internal affairs not only between countries with different systems but "equally between countries belonging to an alliance and having identical or similar systems."

Complementing its case against the superpowers, Peking for the first time called critical attention to Warsaw Pact maneuvers as well as NATO military exercises in Europe last month. While avoiding comment in its own name, NCNA on 17, 24, and 25 September cited European press reports to portray the maneuvers as demonstrating Soviet-U.S. competition on the continent. Peking also cited a Yugoslav observation that the exercises "are first of all, means for exerting pressure and carrying out intervention, means for intimidation and subversion and even a way to cover up other aims and intentions, so as to consolidate unity within blocs."

Peking has continued to play up the Common Market as an example of European cooperation and independence that would counteract superpower influence. Softpedaling recent setbacks of this group, Peking has remained silent on Norway's rebuff of Common Market membership. But it has highlighted the resolution of differences among members concerning the upcoming summit meeting in Paris, stating in an NCNA dispatch of 13 September that "for all their conflicting interests," the West European countries are moving toward closer union in order to uphold their independence.

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FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

MOSCOW REJECTS LINKAGE TO EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

On the public level Moscow has continued to reject any direct linkage between the beginning of negotiations on force reductions in Europe and the start of multilateral preparations for a conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In the month following Presidential adviser Kissinger's 10-14 September Moscow visit, and against the background of Western press speculation concerning discussion in NATO of a reported Soviet proposal on force reductions and CSCE brought back by Kissinger from Moscow, Soviet commentators have shown less and less reluctance to discuss alleged efforts to link the two issues.

The thrust of Moscow's comment and that of its East European allies' has focused on the "complexity" of the force reductions issue, citing such factors as the acknowledged differences among NATO countries over force reductions, the uncertainty about the participants in any deliberations, and the highly "involved" nature of the concepts of force reductions. As a result, the media have maintained, the force reduction issue should not be allowed to encumber the proceedings of the CSCE, the agenda of which has already been approved "in principle, formally or in essence, by many European states"--in the words of a participant on the Moscow radio international observers discussion program of 8 October.

Although Moscow in the last month has not publicly discussed the details of the force reduction question, the Soviet position on NATO's proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) was reviewed in the September issue of *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNAYA OTNOSHENIYA* (WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS) by Yuriy Kostko, a specialist on European affairs. In this article as in an earlier one in the June issue of the same journal, Kostko critically examined the NATO concept of MBFR based on "asymmetrical" models in which Warsaw Pact forces would be reduced in relation to NATO's by a ratio of three or four to one, or "even" six to one.

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COMMENT FOLLOWING
KISSINGER'S VISIT

Reporting the 16 September Washington press conference in which Kissinger discussed his talks with Brezhnev and Gromyko, PRAVDA's TASS-attributed account said Kissinger recalled "that in accordance with the Soviet Union's well-known position, a preliminary meeting must take place by the end of the year on questions of European security and that the USSR has never agreed 'with the U.S. position'--as an official concept--'which states that there must be some sort of link between this conference and a conference on mutual and balanced reductions of armed forces.'" PRAVDA reported Kissinger as saying that the United States was discussing the "important considerations voiced in Moscow" with its allies and that "considerable success" was achieved.

Upon the conclusion of Kissinger's talks in Moscow, a 14 September PRAVDA article by political commentator Yuriy Zhukov cited the New York TIMES to the effect that "there can hardly be any talk of transforming negotiations on the reduction of armed forces into a preliminary condition for holding the conference on security questions," since "this card was played in connection with the four-power agreement on West Berlin and it cannot honestly be used again." Zhukov's article contained the first known reference in Soviet media to Assistant Secretary of State Stoessel's 7 September remarks before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe in which he said multilateral study on MBFR "must also be made before or in parallel with" CSCE multilateral preparatory negotiations.

When the Western press at the end of September reported the NATO Council's discussions of the Soviet "considerations" brought back by Kissinger, Moscow's central media picked up the cue. Writing in the 3 October IZVESTIYA, V. Osipov recalled Kissinger's remarks at his 16 September press conference, pointing out that the Soviet "considerations" were now under discussion in the NATO Council and that "in the opinion of informed commentators, they remove the last obstacles" on the issue. On 5 October, IZVESTIYA's political commentator Matveyev scolded "Atlantist politicians" for attempting to "pressure" the socialist bloc on CSCE preparations in order "to gain for themselves the 'concessions' they desire, particularly concessions on the questions of troop reductions and arms reductions in central Europe."

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KOSTKO ARTICLES Kostko's September article (signed to press 22 August) discussed the question of force reductions in Europe in some detail, reviewing in the process the countervailing positions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Kostko noted that in the January 1972 Warsaw Pact Prague Declaration the socialist bloc had endorsed the principle of examining the question of force and arms reductions, both foreign and national, in Europe without harming the interests of any participants involved and without making the solution a sole prerogative of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Kostko concluded that the 1968 NATO proposal on MBFR was merely propaganda designed to conceal the continuing arms race between the rival blocs. Raising a point made in other recent commentaries, Kostko pointed out that the "contradictions" within NATO impeded the formulation of a "uniform platform" which could be used to counter the policy of the socialist states, noting among other things internal pressures on the United States to withdraw its troops from Western Europe and the possibility of the "rebirth of the 'German threat'" in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal.

In both of his articles, Kostko rejected the NATO "asymmetrical principle" of troop reductions, citing the findings of the London Institute of Strategic Studies that "the numerical correlation between the two sides' land forces in Europe is approximately equal." Rebutting various arguments used by NATO to support asymmetry, Kostko declared that the "geographical factor" has "no particular role at all during the reduction--that is, the disbandment--of units of foreign armed forces in Europe." After noting the highly developed communications system and mobility of the NATO alliance, he said that because of the "enormously long land borders" which the USSR must defend, it must "keep considerable forces not only in the west but also in the south and east of the country"; thus the USSR would have to move troops, for example, from beyond the Urals or Lake Baykal, a distance which is "certainly greater" than between New York and London. When calculating the "geographical factor," Kostko continued, the "global correlation of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact" must also be considered; thus, he said, if a conflict broke out in central Europe "it would be impossible to confine such a conflict" to this area, and the hostilities would "inevitably evolve into a global conflict." But before such a situation could develop, "political decisions rather than military force would have to have the decisive word," Kostko declared. In a world conflict the "global balance of forces" would then assume the main role, he argued, asserting that "the important distances will not be those from Western Europe to the United States and

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the USSR but, say, from Alaska or Okinawa to Vladivostok." He contended that the "geographical factor" must thus also include the U.S. military bases abroad and the U.S. aircraft carriers.

Having broached the issue of U.S. forward bases, Kostko argued that the individual branches of the military forces of the two sides cannot be considered in isolation but that "each side must examine the overall correlation of forces in terms of all indicators," a "complex" situation where "one side's advantages in one branch of arms are canceled out by the other side's advantages elsewhere."

An article by military theoretician Trofimenko in the September issue of USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY had raised similar strategic concepts with respect to the SALT accords in praising the Administration's concept of strategic "sufficiency." He argued that because both sides had taken into account the "so-called 'asymmetries' in the position of the United States and the USSR, in the deployment of their strategic forces and in the balance of those strategic arms unaffected by the limitations (particularly intercontinental bombers), the principle of equal security was implemented in such a way that direct one-to-one ratios were not established for the arms covered by the limitations." Trofimenko observed that the two sides in the SALT negotiations were "required to find appropriate ratios and coordinate the numerous details linked with complex and occasionally extremely delicate and sensitive issues." Pointing up the subordination of military decisions to political considerations, Trofimenko went on to say that "however, Soviet-American agreement in this sphere was able to become reality only as a result of cardinal political solutions overstepping the bounds of purely military-technical problems." He implied that the May 1972 CPSU Central Committee plenum on the eve of the Moscow summit had reached such a decision in regard to the SALT accords.

Kostko's June article (signed to press 23 May), without directly mentioning SALT, had raised issues germane to both SALT and MBFR in linking conventional with nuclear forces. He prefaced these remarks by drawing a connection between the European security conference and force reductions that has not been made in other Moscow comment:

It must be admitted that it is now extremely difficult to assess the overall correlation for all types of arms, primarily because at present there are no objective

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coefficients for comparing different types of arms. Such coefficients are probably still to be formulated in the course of corresponding negotiations, for which special organs created by an all-European conference could prove suitable.

He went on to argue that

the correlation of conventional forces cannot be isolated from the correlation of tactical and strategic nuclear forces, and the regional balance in central Europe cannot be isolated from the all-European and global balances. Analysis shows that all arguments about "military inequality" in the sphere of conventional forces and about the need for "asymmetrical reductions" do not withstand criticism, particularly since under the conditions of equality of strategic nuclear forces and the reduction in the role of conventional forces, a shift in the balance cannot threaten the "vital security interests" of either side.

In both of his articles Kostko asserted that the NATO position on "military inequality" between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in the sphere of conventional forces and on necessity for "asymmetrical reduction" does not stand up to criticism, declaring that this would give NATO a one-sided military advantage "and is, therefore, clearly unacceptable for the Warsaw Pact countries." Kostko concluded:

If the question of a reduction in armed forces and armaments in central Europe is approached from a realistic position, the principle of parity reduction seems to be the only possible one; according to this principle, the general balance which has taken shape would be maintained at a lower level.

A reduction on a parity basis would accord with the main condition--not to be detrimental to countries which participate in such a reduction.

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SPUTNIK ANNIVERSARY

SOVIET COMMENT PUTS NEW STRESS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Moscow marked the 15th anniversary of Sputnik I on 4 October with commentaries by cosmonauts and space scientists which placed primary emphasis on the need for international cooperation in the exploration of space. General statements about the desirability of cooperation had appeared in comment on past space anniversaries and in connection with Soviet space exploits, but the theme had not been a major one. Its prominence now accords with a generally increased level of Soviet publicity for U.S.-Soviet space cooperation since the Moscow summit, following up the agreement on cooperation signed by President Nixon and Premier Kosygin in May and publicizing the meetings of Soviet and U.S. technical experts in Houston in July and in Moscow in early October.

TASS on 4 October underscored the emphasis on cooperation in the sputnik anniversary comment when it reported that "all Moscow newspapers mark the 15th anniversary of the launching of the first Soviet satellite with special articles stressing the advisability of international cooperation in space exploration." References to progress in Soviet-U.S. cooperation have been frequent and have included recollections of the meeting held in Houston to work out details of the proposed Soyuz-Apollo flight. But the commentaries have avoided playing up a purely bilateral effort, picturing broadly based international cooperation and carefully balancing references to U.S.-Soviet projects with mentions of Soviet cooperation with other communist countries and with France.

In discussing cooperation between the Soviet Union and other communist countries, the commentaries have pointed to the "Interkosmos" program set up in 1967 by the USSR, the East European bloc countries, Cuba, and Mongolia. With respect to the "Intersputnik" satellite communications organization established by the same countries in 1971, they have emphasized that the organization operates "on a basis of complete equality, and any state can become a member."

References to the developing cooperation between the Soviet Union and France have focused on joint studies of the upper atmosphere and the aurora borealis, the launching of Soviet rockets with French and Soviet meteorological equipment, and new agreements on joint work in space biology and medicine. Soviet media have

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recently given considerable attention to Soviet-French cooperation in connection with the ninth annual conference on cooperation in space held in Tbilisi from 19 to 26 September. In a NOVOYE VREMYA article assessing the results of the conference, summarized by TASS on 11 October, Boris Petrov, head of the USSR Academy of Sciences' "Interkosmos Council" and a leading spokesman on international space cooperation, said that cooperation with France had reached a "qualitatively new stage" and cited the considerable expansion in the number of joint projects in the last two years.

There have been, at the same time, the customary efforts to justify the costly Soviet space program in terms of its spinoff benefits for basic scientific research and for economic progress. Thus Cosmonaut V. Sevastyanov in the 4 October PRAVDA and Professor M. Vasilyev in IZVESTIYA the same day stressed the benefits of the space program for Soviet society. According to Sevastyanov, the benefits went beyond the provision of a "good experimental base for the solution of a number of fundamental problems of science and technology":

The mastering of the cosmos is closely connected with the technical progress of production. Thousands of types of "earthly" items produced in our day owe their origin to research in outer space, to the development of rocket and cosmic apparatus.

Sevastyanov singled out microminiaturization and automation as two areas where the space program had had an especially important impact. Vasilyev argued that "cosmonautics is aiding appreciably the creation of the material-technical base of communism in our country."

Such comment is accompanied now by advocacy of international cooperation as a means of alleviating the costs of space research. Typically, cosmonaut V. Shatalov, in an interview published in the 4 October issue of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, stressed that the "ever increasing scale" of space experiments and the "high cost and complexity of space programs point toward the expediency of combining the efforts of various countries in this field." Shatalov expressed "special interest" in U.S.-Soviet manned cooperative efforts: He singled out the joint Soyuz-Apollo flight proposed for 1975 and suggested the possibility of a joint U.S.-Soviet manned mission to Mars in the future.

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U S S R - G D R

MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN SHOW WARMTH ON GDR ANNIVERSARY

Soviet and East German observances of the GDR's 23d anniversary on 7 October reflected a warmth that had been missing on the same occasion a year ago when the Honecker regime took a generally reserved attitude toward the FRG treaties with Moscow and Warsaw signed in 1970 and the four-power Berlin agreement signed in September 1971. The Soviet leaders' message to Honecker, Ulbricht, and Stoph reflected the current atmosphere in which Honecker has publicly expressed satisfaction over the developments in European relations and has clearly viewed them as a gain for GDR interests.

Where the only note of warmth in last year's message had been a brief passage in which the Soviet leaders "cordially congratulated" the GDR party, government, and people, this year's message conveyed "cordial congratulations and best regards" to the East Germans and added effusively that the GDR was marking its national day "at the height of its creative strength, in an atmosphere of great political and working activity." It concluded that "with all our hearts" the Soviet leading organs wish the East Germans "new successes in the building of socialism, in the struggle for peace and European security."

Last year's message from the Soviet leaders had appeared to downgrade the personal leadership of Honecker, who had taken over as SED First Secretary in May, noting pointedly that the SED program "relies on the entire previous development of the republic, on the creative enthusiasm and energy of the people, and on the many years' experience of the party and state." It had concluded with an implicitly admonitory statement of the Soviet leaders' "firm conviction that the fraternal friendship between the USSR and the GDR and the inseparable unity of our parties will grow steadily stronger and develop for the good of the peoples of our countries" and in the interests of European and international peace.

PRAVDA ARTICLES Pro forma remarks by Honecker on the FRG treaties with the USSR and Poland, on GDR-FRG relations, and on Berlin in his anniversary article in PRAVDA last year were totally ignored in the TASS summary of the article. His article this year in the 7 October PRAVDA credited the already concluded agreements involving the FRG with having opened the way for "further steps to normalize relations between European states, primarily between the GDR and FRG," in accordance with peaceful coexistence.

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TASS publicized his remarks on GDR-FRG relations, his call for GDR membership in the United Nations, and the steps taken to establish diplomatic relations between the GDR and Finland and Switzerland.

Honecker was also effusive in this year's PRAVDA article on the GDR's loyalty to "proletarian internationalism" as "an inalienable constituent part of the socialist community united around the Soviet Union," which is "the best friend of our people." He declared that these countries "combine their efforts" for peace and that "by joint constructive actions in the interests of peace and relaxation of tension, our countries have wrought important changes in the international atmosphere for the better." An anniversary article by Premier Stoph in IZVESTIYA the same day directly subscribed to the Soviet line on "the coordinated foreign policy activity of the socialist states."

ANNIVERSARY TOAST Honecker's currently sanguine public attitude toward European detente was further evident in his toast at an anniversary reception in East Berlin, published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 8th. Hailing the "positive developments in Europe" which "make us confident," the SED leader observed that "an entire complex of treaties has entered into force" and predicted a "useful and fair result" from current GDR-FRG negotiations. He added a plug for Chancellor Brandt, with an eye to the November FRG elections, in noting that "precisely by taking into account each others' interests, more has been achieved in the way of normalizing and establishing good-neighborly relations between the GDR and the FRG in two years than in over 20 years of CDU/CSU rule." As in his PRAVDA article, Honecker registered enthusiasm on the score of solidarity with the USSR, stressing that the GDR "has fraternal links with the powerful Soviet Union and is irrevocably part of the community of socialist countries which are united ever more firmly around Lenin's country."

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YUGOSLAVIA

TITO PRESSES EFFORTS TO PURGE PARTY OF DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

Tito's promised campaign to discipline party ranks and strengthen the party's role in Yugoslav society has apparently begun, judging from his hard-hitting and widely publicized interview with the Zagreb VJESNIK in which he called for reorganization of the League of Communists and the ouster of party "careerists" and dissidents. Laying propaganda groundwork for the purge, the interview was frontpaged in the Yugoslav central press on 8 October and carried textually by TANJUG and Radio Zagreb. In the interview Tito pointed to an Executive Bureau letter sent to all party members and organizations and signed by him personally as "the first concrete action" in his drive to strengthen party discipline. Although the media have not made public the substance of the letter, they have played it up "as an exceptionally important document" currently under active discussion at all party levels. On 10 October TANJUG reported that the Federal Executive Council would hold a special session on the 13th devoted to "the tasks arising from the letter."

Although Tito covered much familiar ground in the lengthy interview with VJESNIK editor Janekovic, his remarks were notable for their uncompromising and bitter tone with respect to the party's failure to solve its problems. Stressing the need for reorganization of the League of Communists, Tito said that "careerists" and those who do not accept the need for unity must leave. As in his 10 September Kozara speech,* he vehemently assailed elements in the party who have enriched themselves at the expense of others. While condoning the acquisition of a certain amount of earned or inherited wealth, he ruled out "speculation" and stressed that those engaging in it would face expulsion from the party. As a possible corrective measure, he raised the prospect of creating "certain commissions to investigate the origins of large fortunes."

Although Tito again declined to name names or to indicate the scope of the purge, he hinted at one point that it could be extensive. Noting that the present League membership is one million, he observed pointedly: "We do not need more than a million members; we can have several hundred thousand less, although I do not think that the number to be sent away is so high."

* See the TRENDS of 13 September 1972, pages 35-37.

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Tito's frustrations and bitterness were most evident in the latter part of the interview when he was pressed to enumerate further disciplinary actions by the party. Asked to explain the postponement of the 10th League congress from 1973 to the spring of 1974, he stated candidly: "If we were to prepare for a congress now, we would not be able to do anything in particular." In the same vein, he went on to acknowledge that any further disciplinary actions would meet "strong resistance" at forthcoming party forums and that if agreement was not reached on such measures, "we should not be able to do anything, and I cannot resolve this myself."

Asked if the party was at a decisive crossroads when action was mandatory, Tito strongly reasserted his personal authority as the most cohesive force in Yugoslavia and in effect concluded the interview:

I decided long ago I must go through with it . . . and I do not have a lot of time. I am pretty sick of constantly being bothered by these individuals, and therefore I now have to do everything. And I can do it. Do you have any more questions?

The interviewer had no more questions.

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C U B A - U. S.

CASTRO DWELLS ON NEED FOR U.S. TO LIFT "ECONOMIC BLOCKADE"

In an impromptu press conference on 25 September, held prior to ceremonies dedicating a rural school, Fidel Castro answered a question about prospects for U.S.-Cuban relations with a discourse that repeated stock themes but put unusual stress on the need for unconditional lifting of the U.S. "economic blockade." Havana TV, in live coverage of events surrounding the school dedication, carried the bulk of the exchange with reporters but cut off coverage of the press conference after Castro had begun talking about relations with the United States. The only monitored account of these remarks in Cuban media was carried belatedly on the 28th in a PRENSA LATINA international transmission in English, closely paralleling an account disseminated by the Madrid EFE the preceding day.

Castro's comments on U.S.-Cuban relations were triggered by a reporter's question concerning a column in which Jack Anderson wrote that President Nixon was contemplating a move to resume relations with Cuba after the November election and that he believed the only significant conditions were those that might be set by the USSR, not by Cuba itself. Castro retorted angrily that the President is a "rascal" and a "demagogue." It was just after these remarks that Havana TV cut off its live coverage of the exchange with reporters; the announcer broke in to note that Castro was talking with "foreign newspapermen," and the camera turned elsewhere. Whether the coverage was aborted by design because of the subject matter is not clear; Castro has made similarly abusive references to the President and has discoursed truculently on the question of U.S.-Cuban relations in past well-publicized speeches. But it seems noteworthy that no report of his comments on U.S.-Cuban relations appeared in any subsequent telecast or in any monitored radio broadcast.

Playing standard themes, Castro repeated his contention of 26 July that any discussion of U.S.-Cuban relations must also deal with the broad question of U.S. ties in Latin America, and he reasserted the line that any improvement of relations between Havana and Washington must hinge on the United States "ceasing to be a gendarme in Latin America." He led into the blockade question by remarking that the United States is "beginning to correct some of its big mistakes" in international trade policy by lifting its "blockade" of the People's Republic of China and

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the USSR. Arguing that the effort to isolate Cuba economically is no longer of any use to the United States, he concluded that "the blockade policy must disappear because in fact it ceases to be a blockade and turns into a self-blockade."

In a departure from his usual stress on the line that Cuba needs nothing from the United States, the Cuban leader went on to embroider the notion that the ending of economic sanctions would be in the U.S. interest. Because of the "blockade policy," he said, the United States has lost some of its traditional markets to other industrialized countries. He suggested a parallel with the hijacking of planes, observing that the United States "invented the hijacking of planes . . . right here in Cuba" and was now itself the country most affected by the hijackings; by the same token, it was hurting itself by pursuing an economic blockade. While thus elaborately arguing that the United States is the only loser from such a policy, Castro emphasized that the policy must be terminated "with no strings attached," in keeping with his insistence on 26 July that "no economic advantage" could tempt Cuba to sacrifice its principles for the sake of relations with Washington.

While restating the position that it is the United States that must make all the concessions, "without asking for anything in return," Castro apparently chose--to judge from the PRENSA LATINA and EFE reports--to avoid discussing U.S. conditions for an improvement in relations. He had broached the matter of the U.S. position during his swing through East Europe and the USSR this summer, in remarks that betrayed his evident sensitivity to Western press reports that in the wake of the U.S.-Soviet summit the Soviets might press Cuba to moderate its anti-U.S. stand. At a press conference in Sofia on 26 May and again at a Cuban embassy reception in Moscow on 3 July, he alleged that the Nixon Administration sought a severance of Cuban ties to the USSR and a renunciation of Cuban support for world revolutionary movements as preconditions for improved relations. At the reception in Moscow, with Kosygin present, he asserted that Cuba would "never" make such concessions "running counter to our principles, our loyalty and gratitude to the Soviet Union."

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Lifting of the "blockade" has been a staple of the triad of demands made by Castro in past discussions of Cuban-U.S. relations, along with U.S. relinquishment of Guantanamo and cessation of anti-Cuban "subversion." Castro has not normally singled out the blockade question for elaboration, although he has on occasion expressed satisfaction at reports of U.S. political figures' support for lifting of the economic sanctions. Thus in the 26 July speech he noted approvingly that "one of the [U.S. Presidential] candidates favors ending the blockade against Cuba," and in a speech in December 1971 he lauded Senator Edward Kennedy for "serene statements" on the blockade as well as for comments on the Guantanamo issue.

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TOPIC IN BRIEF

USSR - EGYPT

Moscow's concern to project a picture of Soviet-Egyptian amity was pointed up once again when PRAVDA on 9 October reported under a Cairo dateline that "the Egyptian public and press are devoting much attention to the prospects of the development of Egyptian-Soviet relations" and that Prime Minister Sidqi's impending visit "gave rise to satisfaction in the Arab world." The dispatch noted that "a number of items in the Cairo press are devoted to an analysis of the nature of the relations between our countries," but it mentioned only an AL-JUMHURIYA item hailing Egyptian-Soviet friendship. The dispatch concluded that "every genuine Arab patriot" supports close cooperation with the USSR. Moscow has refrained so far from any response to new articles in the Cairo press that have recapitulated Soviet-Egyptian differences, nor has it publicly reacted to the interview with President as-Sadat published in the Lebanese magazine AL-HAWADITH on 5 October in which he revealed new details of his policy disagreements with the Soviet leaders.

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